Roger Williams University Law Review
Volume 26
Issue 3 Vol. 26: No. 3 (Summer 2021)

Article 20

Summer 2021

Colpitts v. W.B. Mason Co., Inc., 227 A.3d 996 (R.I. 2020)
Chad Oliver Stroum
Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Stroum, Chad Oliver (2021) "Colpitts v. W.B. Mason Co., Inc., 227 A.3d 996 (R.I. 2020)," Roger Williams
University Law Review: Vol. 26 : Iss. 3 , Article 20.
Available at: https://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR/vol26/iss3/20

This Survey of Rhode Island Law is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DOCS@RWU. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Roger Williams University Law Review by an authorized editor of DOCS@RWU.
For more information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu.

Employment Law. Colpitts v. W.B. Mason Co., Inc., 227 A.3d 996
(R.I. 2020). An employer is not required to have actual knowledge
that an employee is under the influence, nor that the employee
manifests the specific symptoms usually associated with being
under the influence, to request that an employee adhere to a drug
test. To make such a request, an employer is only required to have
reasonable grounds to believe that an employee is under the
influence of a controlled substance.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

On March 9, 2018, Michael Colpitts (Colpitts) filed a verified
complaint in the Rhode Island Superior Court against W.B. Mason
alleging that on March 5, 2018, while making a delivery as a part
of his work, Colpitts suffered an injury to his right hand.1 The
complaint further alleged that Colpitts then returned to the
worksite and reported the injury to his supervisor, Christopher
Santos (Santos).2 Colpitts further alleged that W.B. Mason
suspended and ultimately terminated his employment, in violation
of Rhode Island General Law section 28-6.5-1, by wrongfully
demanding that he submit to a drug test without reasonable
grounds to believe that he was under the influence of any
intoxicating liquors or controlled substances that might have
impaired his ability to perform his job.3 On August 16, 2018, a
consolidated hearing was held to address both Colpitts’s request for
relief and the merits of the matter.4
Colpitts testified that on the day in question, he was “unable to
finish the day” due to “shooting and extreme pains.”5 Colpitts
recounted that he returned to the job site and requested to leave to
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Colpitts v. W.B. Mason Co., Inc., 227 A.3d 996, 998 (R.I. 2020).
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obtain medical treatment.6 He stated that after ten to fifteen
minutes, Santos returned with Mike Bonito (Bonito), the branch
manager.7 Colpitts testified that he told Santos and Bonito that he
was in “lots of pain.”8 Colpitts then testified that Bonito stated he
believed Colpitts “might be impaired, and that [Santos and Bonito]
want[ed] to get [Colpitts] tested.”9 With respect to the pain he
experienced on the day in question, Colpitts testified that he “felt
like he was going to throw up,” his back was “killing him,” and that
he repeatedly bent over trying to find relief.10
Colpitts stated that, on his way to a medical facility, he
admitted to Santos that he used medical marijuana, and that he
“couldn’t take a drug test because it would prove that he smoked
marijuana,” and there was “no way ‘to prove that he did not smoke
marijuana within a certain amount of time because it stays in your
system.’”11 It was Colpitts’s position that he used marijuana
therapeutically to treat disabilities resulting from injuries
sustained while in the United States Army.12 Colpitts stated that
although he applied for and received a medical marijuana card in
Rhode Island, he never used marijuana “on the clock or on the job,”
nor was he ever “under the effects of marijuana during the course
of his employment.”13 Colpitts further testified that, once at the
facility, he refused to take the drug test but submitted to a
breathalyzer, the results of which came back negative.14 Colpitts
then testified that, on March 8, 2018, Joanna Lowney (Lowney),
W.B. Mason’s H.R. representative, notified him that he had
“violated [W.B. Mason’s] fleet policy” so his employment had to be
terminated.15 On cross-examination, Colpitts conceded that during
the initial exchange at the W.B. Mason warehouse, he did “stutter
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at times, stated he might “puke because of heartburn,” and that he
had forgotten to take his medication.16
Santos testified that on March 5, 2018, Colpitts arrived at the
warehouse unannounced and asked Santos to fill out an injury
report.17 Santos testified that Colpitts was “clenching over . . .
[and] putting his hands on his knees.”18 Santos described Colpitts’s
behavior as “weird.”19 Santos stated Colpitts’s description of the
events was unclear and that Colpitts was “jumping all over the
place.”20 Santos claimed that that due to his suspicions about
Colpitts’s condition, he sought counsel from Lowney and Bonito.21
Both parties agreed to request that Colpitts take a drug test.22
Santos recounted that while Colpitts was informing Bonito of
what happened, Colpitts excessively used the “F word” and was
unable to clearly describe which hand was injured.23 Santos
further testified that Colpitts was not making complete sentences,
kept staggering back and forth, bending over, and repeating that
he was “f***ed up” and that he needed to “catch his breath” and he
was “going to puke.”24 Santos said that after asking Colpitts to
submit to a drug test, Colpitts became agitated, said that he was
fine and would go back to work.25 While in Santos’s car on the way
to the medical facility, Colpitts then showed Santos his medical
marijuana card, detailing that that was the reason he could not
take a drug test.26
Bonito stated that he was concerned over Colpitts’s behavior
that day and described Colpitts’s explanation of events as
“distorted.”27 Bonito elaborated that “what caught [him] off guard
the most was the barrage of ‘F’ bombs,” but not in a way that would
16.
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indicate you had hurt yourself.28 He further indicated that Colpitts
was also abruptly swallowing and hunching over with his hands on
his knees.29 Bonito claimed that Colpitts said that he was going to
“puke” and felt that way when he forgot to take his medication.30
Bonito also testified that he did not see any evidence of extreme
pain and that after requesting Colpitts adhere to a drug test,
Colpitts stated that he was fine and would return to work.31 On
cross-examination, Bonito acknowledged that he noticed Colpitts’s
eyes were dilated, but could not recall if his eyes were red.32
On October 5, 2018, after the close of the trial, the trial judge
rendered a bench decision, concluding that both Santos and Bonito
had reasonable grounds to believe that Colpitts was under the
influence of a controlled substance.33 On November 8, 2018,
Colpitts’s request for a preliminary injunction was denied and
judgement on the merits was entered in favor of W.B. Mason.34
Colpitts appealed.35
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The Court began by noting the standard of review.36 The Court
noted that the factual findings of a trial justice sitting without a
jury in a civil matter will not be disturbed unless those factual
findings are “clearly erroneous.”37 The Court also applies a
deferential standard of review for mixed questions of law and fact.38
However, the Court reviews the trial justice’s conclusions on
questions of law de novo.39
Upon review of the trial justice’s decision, the Court found that
the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in holding that Santos
28.
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and Bonito had reasonable grounds to believe that Colpitts was
under the influence of a controlled substance, satisfying the
standard set forth in section 28-6.5-1.40 The Court noted that some
of Colpitts’s behavior was consistent with not only someone who
was in extreme pain, but also with someone who was under the
influence of a controlled substance.41 The Court found that Santos
and Bonito had reasonable grounds to request a drug test, due to
Colpitts bending over, stating that he had to puke, staggering, and
repeated use of obscenities.42 Although Colpitts pointed out that
odd behavior was not indicative of drug use, the Court reasoned
that an employee’s behavior does not need to lead only to a
conclusion that the employee is under the influence, nor does the
employer need actual knowledge that the employee is definitely
under the influence.43 The Court found that section 28-6.5-1
requires only that there be reasonable grounds that the employee
is under the influence of a controlled substance to request testing
and that Colpitts’s ambiguous and odd behavior satisfied that
bar.44
COMMENTARY

The Rhode Island Supreme Court acknowledged the difficulty
of arbitrarily drawing a line between what types of behavior are
indicative of drug use, or rather of extreme pain.45 The Court was
openly sympathetic to the physical condition of Colpitts, which
resulted from his time served in the United States Army.46

40. See id. at 1004; see also 28 R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-6.5-1(a)(1) (providing
that “[e]mployers may require that an employee submit to a drug test if: [t]he
employer has reasonable grounds to believe based on specific aspects of the
employee’s job performance and specific contemporaneous documented observations, concerning the employee’s appearance, behavior or speech that the
employee may be under the influence of a controlled substance, which may be
impairing his or her ability to perform his or her job.”).
41. Colpitts, 227 A.3d at 1005.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1005.
46. Id.
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However, the Court was clearly bound by the “reasonable grounds”
standard set forth in section 28-6.5-1.47
The Court took the initiative to provide some explanation as to
why the standard to request an employee to submit to drug testing
is so low.48
Employers and supervisors are not medical
professionals and as such should not be expected to distinguish
between symptoms of pain and symptoms of being under the
influence.49 According to the Court, “there is no statutory
requirement that an employer possess a degree of medical
sophistication” to request that an employee submit to a drug test.50
Through this reasoning, the Court noted that the standard to
request that an employee take a drug test is low because raising the
bar would effectively require that employers have some degree of
medical sophistication in order to request drug testing.51 The Court
recognized that the legislative intent of section 28-6.5-1 was to
permit employers to request the testing based solely on
contemporaneous observations, such as unusual appearance,
behavior, or speech that may be indicative of drug use, so that a
worker’s ability to perform their job is not impaired and the safety
of all employees can be ensured.52
Although the cause of Colpitts’s behavior was open to more
than one interpretation, employers and the judicial system should
not be required to decipher what is, or what is not, behavior
definitively indicative of drug use. The reasonable grounds
standard prevents the courts from arbitrarily drawing lines that
should be left to individuals with medical expertise. It would be
difficult to keep the workplace safe if the standard required an
employer to have actual knowledge of an individual’s drug use
before requesting that they to submit to a drug test.
A secondary issue that arises in this case, as Colpitts points
out, is the lack of technology currently available to precisely
determine at what time an individual was, or whether they

47.
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currently are, under the influence of marijuana.53 Colpitts
submitted to a breathalyzer, which can tell if one is currently under
the influence of alcohol, but refused to take a drug test because of
current technology’s inability to accurately pinpoint the time of
marijuana use.54 With the medical marijuana field growing every
day, and the increase of its use by the public, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court will likely have to take the absence of such
technology into consideration in cases involving employees who do
submit to the drug testing, subsequently test positive for marijuana
use, and then challenge employment termination.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that that the trial
justice did not abuse her discretion because Colpitts’s incoherent
and volatile behavior were reasonable grounds for an employer to
believe that an employee was under the influence of a controlled
substance, thus giving the employer the ability to request an
employee to submit to drug testing.55 The Court determined that
it was not a requirement of the statute for an employer to have a
degree of medical sophistication in order to determine that an
employee was definitely under the influence of a controlled
substance prior to requesting testing.56
Chad Oliver Stroum
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